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Abstract 
The article attempts to determine what may be expected from wealth taxes on property in the present Polish economy 
and in which circumstances. The criteria of assessment are fiscal, economic and social tax functions. The ideas included 
in the article are meant to contribute to a scholarly discussion on the property taxation order in certain European 
countries, including Poland. The conclusions from the analysis of functions of wealth taxes on property indicate the 
necessity for changes in the funding systems of communes in Poland. These taxes have a serious advantage over other 
sources due to the freedom of disposal and possibility of affecting their volume.    
Keywords: local taxes, wealth taxes on property, local authorities budget 
1. Introduction–Subject Matter, Terminology and Methodological Remarks 
Local budgets own revenues constitute a special category of income. Their volume and primarily their share in the total 
revenue structure are treated as a peculiar litmus test of the local government financial sovereignty. An essential part of 
local self-government funding, according to the theory of public finance and the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government (1994), should come from their own revenues with regard to which self-government communities 
could execute their own tax policies. The theory and practice of public finance confirm the rule that the use of public 
funds is more effective when fund administrators and public tasks managers are closer to the community in whose 
favour they operate (Owsiak, 2001). The theories providing arguments for the decentralisation of the decision process 
and strong local government structures due to better effectiveness, responsibility, managerial skills and decision 
autonomy include the decentralisation theorem (Oates, 1969), the adequacy theory (Tiebout, 1956) as well as regulation 
principles within the “theory of public choice” (Stigler, 1957). 
Therefore, public finance decentralisation processes should be followed by the strengthening of local government 
entities’ financial independence (Kornberger-Sokołowska, 2001). This strengthening is effected for example through 
granting them rights with regard to the acquisition of funds. Hence, it is recommended that the significance of local 
taxes as local self-government instruments stimulating the social and economic development of the area should be 
increased (Denek, 2005). 
In European countries local taxes are diversified. The dominating role is played by models in which property tax is one 
of the most important. A major diversifying element within the European property taxation system is the method of tax 
base calculation, which is related the property value or area. The area property taxation systems are applied only in a 
few Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland. In the case of tax calculated on the basis of property area 
the tax base is a combination of the floor area and land acreage. Importantly, when determining tax according to its unit 
value (property area unit), one generally does not consider the tax base related factors which would reflect location, 
market determinants and property quality. Hence, in practice, diversified tax rates are applied. Depending on the 
purpose, i.e. housing or business, property tax rates may differ even more than tenfold.   
The article attempts to find out what may be expected from wealth taxes on property in the present Polish economy and 
in which circumstances. The criteria of assessment are fiscal, economic and social tax functions.  
Disregarding theoretical dispute on the role of state or the scale of interference in the social and economic phenomena, 
it should be admitted that the idea which indicates that taxes should primarily meet fiscal functions (fiscal function 
superiority) is appropriate. Public authorities do not only accumulate tax revenues but also determine their titles and 
construction, which is closely related to the non-fiscal functions of taxation (Małecka-Ziembińska, 2012). The research 
of the fiscal function of wealth taxes must not omit their non-fiscal impact.   
Therefore, with regard to individual functions of tax on immovable property it is necessary to: 
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 consider the possibility of adjusting the volume of local tax revenue to the tasks within the competence of the 
local government (fiscal function); 
 combine non-fiscal functions with the functions of local government goal. An opinion, supported by the 
practice of many EU countries, may be formulated that irrespective of the degree of decentralisation of public 
finance, the local government is treated as a public legal entity which should affect the social and economic 
development in its area. Thus, assuming that its activity is not confined to tasks within public utilities, but it 
consists in influencing social and economic phenomena, the resignation from the use of non-fiscal functions of 
wealth taxes is impossible. If local authorities are beneficiaries of wealth tax revenues, they should not be 
neutral with regard to the arising social needs or problems and difficulties faced by the entities within the area 
of the local self-government operation. However, a reservation should be made that the impact of non-fiscal 
functions of property taxes, due to their wealth character, is less significant than that of income taxes or 
consumption taxes.  
Communes are the entities which are subject to analysis. In Poland they take advantage of a well-developed group of 
their own revenues, which, as a consequence, allows the local authorities to affect their efficiency. They include 
revenues from local taxes representing primarily the category of immovable property taxation in the form of property 
tax, agricultural tax and forestry tax. 
2. Methodology and Results 
2.1 Fiscal Function – Fiscal Efficiency of Taxes on Immovable Property in Relation to other Components of the 
Commune Revenue System  
The data on commune budget revenues and their most significant own tax revenues in the years 2004-2013 are 
presented in Table 1. In the case of local taxes commune councils have a definite scope of tax authority defined by an 
act of law. The local tax authority includes the right of commune to collect taxes in favour of the local budget - the so 
called passive tax authority, and also to set their volume primarily through the opportunity to set tax rates (equal to or 
lower than the mandatory maximum rates), to introduce reliefs and exemptions – the so-called active tax authority. In 
the case of the latter scope of authority, communes may affect the volume of public funds used to implement tasks 
through the intervention in the construction of certain elements of local taxes.  
Table 1. Communes budget revenues in the years 2004-2013 (in millions zlotys) 
Specification 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Revenues total 72062.3 82083.0 92710.2 103876.5 111761.6 115209.7 126196.1 132690.5 139654.5 144260.0 
Own revenues 39853.3 46284.4 52257.2 61088.9 65063.2 63284.1 66547.6 70441.7 73930.5 78604.8 
Tax revenues 
including: 
Tax revenue related 
to active tax 
authority, (in the 
first place taxes on 
real property),  
Tax revenues 
related to passive 
tax authority. 
28739.4 
 
12610.5 
 
 
 
 
 
16128.9 
31932.0 
 
13434.1 
 
 
 
 
 
18497.9 
35507.1 
 
13841.5 
 
 
 
 
 
21665.6 
42187.8 
 
14603.7 
 
 
 
 
 
27584.1 
45603.9 
 
15677.6 
 
 
 
 
 
29926.3 
44172.4 
 
16451.7 
 
 
 
 
 
27720.7 
44648.6 
 
17133.7 
 
 
 
 
 
27514.9 
48139.1 
 
18387.7 
 
 
 
 
 
29751.4 
50891.5 
 
20292.0 
 
 
 
 
 
30599.5 
 
53507.4 
 
21563.4 
 
 
 
 
 
31944.0 
Source: author’s own material based on: [Sprawozdanie z wykonania budżetu państwa]. 
Table 2. Commune revenues on account of tax on immovable property, their share in commune budget revenues and in 
GDP as well as the rate of growth in the years 2006-2013 (in millions zlotys and percentages) 
Specification 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Revenues on account of taxes on immovable property    
in millions zlotys 
13117.5 13791.1 14850.5 15611.2 16276.8 17503.3 19375.2 20622.4 
Share of revenues on account of taxes on immovable 
property    
in commune budget revenues in percentages 
14.1 13.3 13.3 13.6 12.9 13.2 13.9 14.3 
Share of revenues on account of taxes on immovable 
property    
in GDP in percentages  
1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 
Share of commune budget revenues in GDP in 
percentages  
8.7 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.8 8.5 8.6 8.7 
Rate of growth of immovable property tax payments in 
percentages   
101.7 102.6 103.3 101.6 101.6 103.1 106.7 105.5 
Rate of growth of commune budget revenues in 
percentages 
111.8 109.3 103.3   99.6 106.7 100.8 101.4 102.4 
GDP growth rate in percentages 106.2 107.2 103.9 102.6 103.7 104.8 101.8 101.7 
Business and Management Studies                                                               Vol. 1, No. 2; 2015 
142 
 
Source: author’s own material based on the data in Table 1 and [Polska – wskaźniki makroekonomiczne]. 
Some interesting conclusions may be drawn from the analysis of statistical measures of commune finance independence 
(share of property tax revenues in total revenues, commune own revenues and tax revenues). Interestingly, in the 
examined period there was a declining significance of wealth taxes within the system of commune self-government 
funding, which may indicate decreasing financial independence. The deterioration of commune revenue potential due to 
the process of falling fiscal efficiency of local tax revenue sources is a serious threat to the implementation of social and 
economic tasks and goals within the system of local economy. Admittedly, since 2008 there has been a slight 
improvement in these relations but they are still at the significantly different level from that of 2004.   
Due to the fact that from among all local taxes, wealth taxes on property play the most important role, Table 2 presents 
data with regard to commune revenues on this account, their share in commune budget revenues and in GDP as well as 
the growth rate in the years 2006−2013. Apparently, taxes on immovable property as a source of revenue have not 
always constituted a sufficiently stable part of communes’ own revenues (on the average about 13.5% of all commune 
budget revenues). A slight significance of wealth taxes is confirmed by the measurement of their share in GDP (1.1 – 
1.2%). From among all wealth taxes on property, property tax should be regarded fiscally most significant. It provided a 
substantial part of funds for public tasks implementation, and in the analysed period its average share in wealth taxes 
amounted to over 87%. Its position in commune budgets depends not only on the activities of local authorities but first 
of all on the adopted systemic solutions (the property tax system primarily based on property area, limited tax authority 
or considerable divergence in property taxes depending on the purpose). The share of property tax in commune total 
budget revenues during the analysed period did not change and amounted to 13%. In relation to GDP, the share of this 
tax is also nearly linear (it fluctuated in between 1 and 1.1%). The revenues achieved by communes on account of 
property tax are moderately sensitive to business cycles in economy. For example, in the period of the poor economic 
situation begun in 2008 commune tax revenues showed rising dynamics, except for 2011. Agricultural tax is the second 
largest with regard to the volume of revenue. Its share in local taxes amounts on the average to about 7%. However, 
quoting subsequent factors, i.e. the share of revenues on account of agricultural tax in commune budget revenues (1% 
share) and in GDP (0.1% share), there is no doubt that we are dealing with a construction of a definitely marginal fiscal 
significance. From among all wealth taxes, the biggest changes are connected with the revenues from agricultural tax. 
Revenues from this tax due to the applied solution in the area of rate setting are dependent on the prices of rye. Pegging 
revenues from this tax to the price of only this product led to the possibility of tax setting in relation to the atmospheric 
conditions or the situation on the world agricultural markets at an either exceptionally high or low level.   
2.2 Economic Function of Wealth Taxes on Property in Poland 
In order to answer the question if taxes on immovable property in Poland are an instrument of social and economic 
policy, it is necessary to analyse data on the value of tax preferences in local taxes. The global amount reflecting local 
preferences identified in local taxes came up in 2007 to about 7.7 billion zlotys
1
, which accounted for only nearly 0.5% 
of GDP. For comparison, the total value of tax preferences in state taxes amounted in 2012 to 73.8 billion zlotys, which 
accounted for 4.6% of GDP. In the years 2009-2012 the value of preferences in wealth taxes rose nominally by nearly 
22.5%. The dominating areas of support are: agriculture (36.8% of total preferences in local taxes in 2012) and transport 
and environmental protection (17.7% of total value of preferences in local taxes in 2012). The sectors which minimally 
benefited from the aid of local self-government are the areas of economic and social policy. In fact, there is no real 
opportunity to exert an impact on social and economic processes through the present solutions in the area of wealth 
taxes. Potential social and economic effects are in a way, a side-effect of the fiscal goal implementation.  
The presented conclusions may be confirmed by the data concerning local tax policies on the basis of which it will be 
possible to examine the results perceived as budget effects. In the examined period the joint financial effects of the 
conducted tax policy nominally rose by 31%, communes to a greater extent used their rights to reduce rates (a rise of 
over 35%) than to apply other tools, primarily of a discretionary character (a rise of over 20%). And for example, in 
2012 the financial effects of the use of all instruments in taxes on immovable property amounted to almost 3.8 billion 
zlotys, of which: the reduction in rates amounted to nearly 2.8 billion zlotys (74%) and granting reliefs, exemptions, 
remissions and postponements to about 1 billion zlotys (26%). Financial losses connected with the reductions in local 
taxes were stable (19.5%). The value of fiscal support does not constitute a special burden for the commune budget; its 
effects on the average do not exceed 3% of the total revenues. The application of the instruments by communes consists 
in a conscious resignation from potential budget revenues and may contribute to the stimulation of local entrepreneurs’ 
                                                        
1
 This amount considerably differs from the value of preferences discussed later in the article. In this case, the considered tax 
preferences resulted either from acts of law or commune rights to conduct an autonomous tax policy. In the remaining cases tax 
preferences were confined to those made effective in the form of commune council resolutions.   
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activities and attraction of foreign investors. It should be positively assessed that the value of the lost revenues due to 
lower local self-government tax rates is definitely higher than that due to granting other tax preferences. It indicates that 
communes to a greater extent apply the policy of systemic than individual support.  
Table 3. The use of commune tax authority tools in the years 2008-2012 
Specification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
in millions zlotys 
Total tax preferences in tax on immovable property  2892.5 3092.3 3113.3 3221.0 3787.6 
Reduction in upper tax rates 2068.1 2147.7 1978.8 2279.2 2795.7 
Reliefs and others 824.4 944.6 1134.5 941.8 991.9 
in relations to revenues from taxes on immovable property in percentages  
Total tax preferences in tax on immovable property  19.5 19.8 19.1 18.4 19.5 
Reduction in upper tax rates 13.9 13.8 12.2 13.0 14.4 
Reliefs and others 5.6 6.0 6.9 5.4 5.1 
Source: author’s own material based on: [Sprawozdanie z wykonania budżetu państwa].  
When discussing the economic functions of taxes, it is worth pointing to the possibility of adjusting their volume to the 
kind of commune tasks. It is recommendable that communes should have funds adequate to the scale of public tasks 
accomplished by them. In the years 2008-2012 commune spending in relation to GDP initially rose from 8.9% to 9.6% 
(allocation function strengthened at the central level), and then slightly fell to 8.8% in 2012. It seems that the commune 
financial situation, and consequently the limitation of the level of implemented public tasks could be affected by the 
economic and financial crisis. As already mentioned, the share of taxes on immovable property in the gross domestic 
product is a completely different issue. No doubt that even if the tasks of the local self-government are limited, e.g. 
confined to the area of public utilities, wealth taxes have a moderate significance as instruments of local government tax 
authority.   
2.3 Social Functions of Wealth Taxes on Property in Poland 
The opponents of the present system of property taxation emphasize primarily the lack of justice when levying tax 
burden on tax payers possessing property, whose state and age may substantially differ. The formula of quantitative 
calculation of tax base does not account for the degree of amortization of property, and in this way it does not allow for 
the property economic diversification. For property tax collection, issues like the state of property, its value or the class 
of land are insignificant. However, the level of taxes is affected by the classification of land and buildings in the register 
as well as the way the property is used.  
Building floor areas are levied with incommensurately higher taxes than land areas, which frequently leads to 
speculation and keeping land undeveloped in favourable locations, for example in town centres. The highest tax rates 
concern land and buildings used to conduct economic activity as well as buildings which meet the needs related to this 
activity.  Maximum rates of property for housing purposes are nearly 32-fold lower in the case of buildings twofold in 
the case of land than the property earmarked for business. Preferential taxation of housing property owners reduces the 
share of wealth tax in the total tax burden of households. Thus, it is possible to speak about a social function of taxes 
pursued in favour of a selected group of taxpayers. In real terms, however, what is seen here is the social injustice. The 
area based taxation system does not allow for the differentiation of tax levies with regard to the value of property owned 
by the taxpayer and the quota tax rate system adopted by the legislator does not account for the taxpayer’s payment 
capability. Hence, owners of property of a lower market value pay the same amounts of tax dues as owners of property 
of a much better housing standing. All this leads to the situation that, in the case reference of tax dues calculated 
according to such a system of tax rates to the value of property, it is easy to notice the effect of regressiveness of 
property tax.  
The construction of the next tax, i.e. agricultural tax approaches the principle of tax justice due to the idea of a 
conversion hectare, whose construction includes elements indispensable to diversify agricultural land in relation to its 
quality (kind and class of agricultural land, classification of a given area to one of four tax districts), not excluding the 
principle of efficiency. It concerns only agricultural areas exceeding 1 hectare. Thus, if the area does not exceed 1ha, it 
cannot be regarded as a farm. It is still levied with an agricultural tax, however, at a higher rate. So, serious doubts may 
arise here with regard to the idea of social justice. Let us also emphasize that the division into two categories may lead 
to economically unjustified enlargement of the possessed agricultural land in order to avoid paying higher taxes.    
In forestry tax, the tax base is the number of hectares, which makes kind of trees growing in the area irrelevant at all. 
The weakness of the current solutions consists in the disregard for the ”content” of land (species of trees growing in the 
area), i.e. their real market value.  
Assessing the implementation of the social function of taxes on property, one should account for the disproportion 
observed between them (Table 4). 
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Table 4. Comparison of quota rates for agricultural forestry and commercial areas in the years 2008-2013 
Specification of land Rate per 1 m2 in zlotys 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Farmland  0.0146 0.014 0.0085 0.0094 0.019 0.019 
Other agricultural land 0.0292 0.0279 0.0171 0.0188 0.0371 0.0379 
Forestland 0.0032 0.0034 0.003 0.0034 0.0041 0.0041 
Commercial land 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.84 0.88 
Source: author’s own material based on the data on property tax rates in the years 2008-2013 published in the 
Announcements of the Finance Minister and GUS data on the average rye purchase price and the average selling price 
of wood. 
Taxes on farmland, other agricultural land and forestland are several dozen times lower than those on commercial land 
property, which may result from a specific mechanism of setting the tax base and taxes on farmland (monetary value 
equal to 2.5 quintals of rye calculated for a conversion hectare), other agricultural areas (monetary value equal to 5 
quitals of rye calculated for a physical hectare), forestland (monetary value equal to 0.22 m
3 
calculated for a physical 
hectare of forest). The greatest doubt is raised with regard to the rates in agricultural tax. It turns out that in Poland the 
amount of tax levy is determined exclusively by the price of one of many agricultural products: rye, which is not a 
major product in majority of farms. Therefore, in the context of the specificity of present and future agricultural 
activities this solution is to be considered improper (Felis, 2015).   
3. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The formulated conclusions are to find out what may be expected from the current area based system of property 
taxation in Poland.   
Firstly, wealth taxes are treated generally as most significant local revenues reflecting the income potential of the 
commune (as they possess majority of features regarded as desirable for local taxes), they do not always create a 
sufficiently stable part of Polish communes’ own revenues. The fiscal significance of wealth taxes results primarily 
from the revenues from only one tax, namely the property tax, while the financial relevance of other taxes, i.e. 
agricultural tax and forestry tax is marginal.   
Secondly, the analysed wealth taxes include, with certain exceptions, quota tax rates. The construction of tax rates 
adopted by the legislator results from the tax base, which in all three taxes on the possessed property is based on a 
differently expressed property area. The analysis of tax rates in property taxes allows for the statement that the 
disproportion in their volume is discernible. It concerns primarily a decisively bigger tax burden, in relation to other 
things levied with tax, with regard to property connected with business activity. Such an unexpected differential may 
give rise to well-grounded objections in the context of justice in property taxation.      
Thirdly, the application of instruments through which commune authorities may affect the local development processes 
is pursued by means of decisions to determine the ultimate height of tax rates as well as to differentiate tax rates, 
exemptions and reliefs. Property tax rates are most significant from the perspective of non-fiscal functions of a property 
taxation system. Apparently, taxes on the possessed property have been used to pursue non-fiscal goals to a very limited 
extent. It results from the nature of wealth levies (they are benefits in kind, in the case of which the object of taxation is 
given priority) as well as the method of quantification of the tax base (area related system of property tax). The blame 
for the limited use of property taxation to implement non-fiscal functions should also rest with insufficiently discernible 
burden of tax levies, which is especially well seen in the case of agricultural and forestry taxes.   
Fourthly, the assessment of solutions which are related to the budget revenue losses should take into account the 
efficiency of certain tax instruments in practice. The problem is becoming increasingly important when the consent of 
the legislator to the application of these instruments causes considerable reductions in budget revenues. In real terms, it 
is difficult, due to multidirectional scope of tax instruments impact, to explicitly assess the efficiency of this impact. It is 
important, however, for the discussed problem that the analysis of creating communes’ own revenue potential and the 
results of application of tools of tax authority indicates that they reduced achievable revenues only insignificantly.  
In conclusion, the construction defects of property taxes in Poland lead not only to the reduction in their fiscal potential 
but also their usefulness as an instrument to develop an efficient spatial and local development policy. As a consequence, 
this insufficiently efficient funding system reduces the investment activeness of communes. The conclusions from the 
analysis of functions performed by taxes on immovable property taxes in Poland should aim at the implementation of 
the target model, free of dysfunctions and negative side effects. It would be a right solution to create a single tax on 
property based on its value. A change in one tax must not disregard the whole tax system. Therefore, the imposition of 
an efficient tax on property value has to be effected together with a reduction in fiscal burden within other taxes, for 
example income taxes. 
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